Within a few days in October 2008, following serious turmoil on financial markets worldwide, some 85% of the Icelandic banking sector collapsed, together with the Icelandic currency, the króna. Almost all the rest followed early in 2009. The Icelandic stock market took a nosedive. The Republic of Iceland had entered the worst economic crisis of its history.
Introduction
Iceland's GDP, which had been growing rapidly in the pre-crisis years contracted by 6.6 percent in 2009 and 4.2 percent in 2010 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013) . In the preceding years many companies and individuals had been tempted by relatively low interest rates abroad, compared with the exceedingly high rates in Iceland, to borrow in foreign currencies. Their debts now more than doubled in less than a year (Daníelsson&Zoëga, 2009, p.14) . The consequences of the crisis for the Icelandic people have been severe, and will remain so for years to come.
But no less severe were the consequences for Icelandic municipalities. Many had been investing in infrastructure in the pre-crisis years, trying to attract new companies and inhabitants. This was especially true in the Capital Area, (the capital city Reykjavík and the 6 municipalities around it) and in Suðurnes, a peninsula close to the capital.
Many had amassed debt in foreign currency, and when the króna collapsed, their debts multiplied. High inflation was also an important factor in this respect, since most loans in Iceland are indexed to inflation (Íslandsbanki, 2015) . This paper will go briefly through what happened, how the municipalities tackled this new reality, where they are now in this respect, which political implications the crisis had in the largest and hardest hit municipalities and whether there are lessons that can be learned.
Icelandic municipalities
As in so many other countries, the 20 th century in Iceland was characterized by urbanization. Therefore, by the end of the century, around 70% of the Icelandic population was living in the capital city, Reykjavik, or its neighbouring towns (within a 100 km radius) and 90% of the population increase in Iceland in the last decade occurred there (Nordregio, 2014, p. 17) . Iceland has a population of approximately a third of a million with a population density of 3.1 per km 2 . In 2014 there were 74 municipalities in Iceland with a population span of 50 to 118,000 inhabitants (57% of them have fewer than 1,000 inhabitants) (HagstofaÍslands, 2014) . Formally, Iceland has a two-tier administrative system, but local authorities have organized regional associations (landshlutasamtök), the importance of which varies from one region to another. (Magnússon & Hlynsdóttir, 2014, p. 2) . In the capital area cooperation on important aspects, such as public transport and planning has been growing steadily in recent years (M. Á. Skjöld Magnússon, 2014).
The autonomy of the Icelandic municipalities is constitutionally protected, which has led to the state being reluctant in initiating a mandatory large-scale territorial reform on the local level similar to the territorial reforms that have taken place in the other Nordic countries in past decades. This does not mean that there have been no territorial reforms: in 1990 there were 206 municipalities in Iceland so significant strides have been taken in this respect in the last quarter of a century. Although initiated by functional decentralization by the state, the amalgamation processes have mainly been bottom-up in contrast to top-down incentives in the neighbouring countries (Hlynsdóttir, 2002) .
Icelandic local authorities have until recently benefitted from a large degree of fiscal autonomy, especially in their budget and borrowing activities. This became evident after the financial crisis in 2008 when several local authorities experienced serious financial difficulties, partly because of lack of auditing on the part of the central government. One of the responses was to impose stricter fiscal regulation in the new Local Government Act in 2011 ("Sveitarstjórnarlög, 2011 ("Sveitarstjórnarlög, nr. 138," 2011 .
When compared to the other Nordic countries, where municipal and regional authorities account for roughly two-thirds of official spending, in Iceland, even though it has grown somewhat in the last decades, the proportion is closer to one third (Kristinsson, 2007, p. 248-9) . Haraldsson, 2014, p. 11) .
The Hardest Hit
This quick population growth strained the infrastructure of the area and it is safe to say that the construction industry was overstretched during the period. New neighbourhoods were planned, prepared and built, much of which was financed by borrowing abroad in an international capital market flooded with cheap capital.
Iceland's credit rating was during these years amongst the best in the world and this was reflected in the ratings of Icelandic municipalities that had a relatively easy access to capital in international markets (Moody's Investors Service, 2008) .
Borrowing in foreign currency meant that when the Icelandic currency took a nosedive, the debts of these municipalities almost doubled without their incomes being affected in a similar manner. Reykjanesbaerin the lead. One small municipality, Álftanes, (population ca. 2,500) the site of the residence of the President of Iceland squarely within the Capital Area, became a casualty of the crisis. Due to the extravaganza of a swimming pool it built during the boom years, the debts it had amassed were so impressive, that it had no option other than,in the year 2013,to mergeinto a significantly larger neighbouring municipality, the financially strong Garðabaer (population ca. 11,000), mainly inhabited by citizens with higher than average incomes("Alþingi, þingskjal 611 -104. mál.," 2014).
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On 1 January 2012 a new Local Government Act came into force with stricter fiscal regulations for municipalities. Thus now the debt ratio of municipalities could not be higher than 150 per cent of its revenues ("Sveitarstjórnarlög, 2011 ("Sveitarstjórnarlög, nr. 138," 2011 .
Although this is a worthy goal for the future, it does not reflect the reality of many Icelandic municipalities today in the wake of the financial crisis. Thus in 2013, Reykjanesbaer's ratio was the highest, 271.4 per cent of income. The average for all Icelandic municipalities was at that time 184 per cent and a year earlier they were on average 213 per cent (Haraldsson, 2014, p. 12 ). The municipalities above the 150 per cent target were given ten years from 1 January 2013 to reach the benchmark and debts have been going down significantly (Íslandsbanki, 2015) .
It must be noted that not all the debts are a result of foreign borrowing to pay for infrastructure, some of it reflects the obligations of these municipalities in pension funds, the debts of municipal companies, such as utility services and geothermal plants and rent contracts into the future, but some municipalities, such as Reykjanesbaer, "outsourced" housing for schools and municipal services, by having private companies building, owning and running the houses and the municipality renting it from these private actors long term. Such contracts accounted for 34 per cent of the total debt of Reykjanesbaer in 2013. Previously such rent contracts were excluded from municipal annual accounts, but since 2010 the municipalities have been obliged to factor them in (Haraldsson, 2014 p. 14).
Municipalities' Reactions To The Crisis
In 2011 the Association of Icelandic Municipalities (Sambandíslenskrasveitarfélaga) published a report on the fiscal reactions of Icelandic municipalities to the crisis in which it was shown that most of them were in the process of undertaking significant measures to cut budgets and restructure the ways things were done to meet the contraction in revenues caused by the crisis. Many of them did so without consulting the citizens, but those that did reported better results. Much of the municipal expenses are salaries so it came as no surprise that around a half of the municipalities foresaw downsizing staff. Also, many municipalities in Iceland are small and the tasks they are obliged to perform are formidable and sensitive, such as social services, general administration, education, childcare, culture, sports and youth activities, so increased cooperation was also high on the agenda. (Samband íslenskra sveitarfélaga, 2011, p. 5 of those polled in the capital area and Suðurnes said the crisis had had a great or very great impact on their municipality's finances, but only 38% of those in the rural regions.
"Some impact" was, however, visible in the rural regions, where 43% used that phrase to describe the effects of the crisis, compared to 18% of those in the capital area and Suðurnes (see figure 2). Thus, the crisis and the responses to it are obviously very salient issues amongst Icelandic municipalities. Seventy-two per cent of those who responded acknowledged that their municipalities took specific measures to tackle the consequences of the crisis, 16% said that their municipalities did not take any specific measures and 12% were not aware whether or not anything in particular was done. None of the municipalities where the respondents claimed no measures had been taken were in the capital area. Of those polled, most mentioned "cuts in municipal budget" as the main measure (121), "new priorities in spending" (90), "adjustments of salaries" (86), "changes in prices of municipal services" (80), "projects postponed" (78), "organisational changes within local government" (68), "renegotiations with lenders" (51), "sale of properties" (50) and "specific reactions in social services" (48). Other measures were mentioned less often.
Most (92%) were in agreement that the measures undertaken had produced at least some results. Sixteen per cent said they had produced very significant results, 39%
significant results and 37% some results. Only 4% said they had produced little or very little results, and 4% did not know one way or the other. It is perhaps no surprise that none of those who claimed some responsibility for the measures thought that they were in vain. Cuts in budgets were also most frequently mentioned as the one measure that and council members were of the view that the government's responses to the crisis had been less than helpful if viewed in terms of the impact they had had on their municipalities' means to tackle the crisis. Only 2% of the respondents found the government's measures very helpful; 15% found them somewhat helpful, 44% neither helpful nor unhelpful, 23% rather unhelpful and 5% very unhelpful; 11% claimed not to know one way or the other. There is also a slight difference here between the capital area and Suðurnes, on the one hand, and the rural areas on the other, as can be seen in figure 3 . Those in the rural areas are slightly more negative, with 38% saying the government's measures were rather, or very, unhelpful, while 19% of those in the capital area and Suðurnes said they were rather unhelpful and no one said they were very unhelpful.
FIGURE 3: IMPACT OF THE MANOEUVRES OF THE STATE ON THE MUNICIPALITIES' EFFORTS TO TACKLE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS
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As to the measures taken by the government which the respondents found most helpful/unhelpful, most mentioned changing the regulatory framework regarding municipal finances without consulting the municipalities as the most adverse measure.
This was the case both in the capital area and in the rest of the country. In the rural areas, downsizing of infrastructure projects, cut-backs in public positions and the government's perceived hostility towards the fishing industry were mentioned as having had an unhelpful effect on the municipalities' means to tackle the effects of the financial crisis.
In rural areas, creating stability was mentioned as the government's main positive achievement; in the capital area, mention was made of infrastructure projects and job creation measures to tackle increasing unemployment.
Given the difficult relations between the two tiers of government in recent years, the attitudes toward the state come as no surprise. Two major shifts in competences have taken place between the two tiers in the last two decades. Responsibility for primary education was transferred to the local authorities in 1996, and the financial burden, and not least administrational complexity of providing educational services, proved to be too much for many small local authorities (Hlynsdóttir, 2002) . The provision of services to disabled people was transferred to the municipalities on 1 January 2011 under a contract signed in 2010 ("Samkomulagríkisogsveitarfélaga um tilfaersluþjónustuviðfatlaða," 2010 , Sambandíslenskrasveitarfélaga, 2014 . It is the opinion of the municipalities that sufficient funds have not followed in the wake of these transfers, and the Association of Icelandic Municipalities has recently put together a "grey book" listing 24 points in which it believes the state is in direct breach of contract on the allocation of funds to the municipalities ("Grábóksveitarfélagaoghvítbókríkisins," 2014).
Political Implications
Municipal elections take place in Iceland every fourth year, the last one being in 2014. When looking at the results of the four elections that have taken place in the 21 st century, it is possible to see democratic reactions to the crisis. However they are twofold. In the first wave in the municipal elections in 2010, when the severity of the crisis had not materialised into serious actions on behalf of the municipalities, there was a reaction towards voting "anti-establishment".
This was especially visible in Reykjavík, where a new party, jokingly named "The
Best Party" and headed by the comedian Jón Gnarr, took the elections by storm and got 34.7 per cent of the votes and 6 city council members, out of fifteen ("Sveitarstjórnarkosningar," 2015) . It went on and formed a majority with the Social Democratic Alliance (SDA) with Gnarr as the mayor. In Akureyri -Iceland's "second city"
outside the capital area, the so-called "List of the People" (Listifólksins) got a pure majority of 6 council members out of eleven. It was not an entirely new party, it had council members in the two previous elective terms, and was perhaps not as "antiestablishment" as The Best Party, but the result was considered an enormous blow to the traditional parties, especially the centre-right Independence Party (IP) that lost 3 out of its previous four council members and was relegated into minority.
The Independence Party, long the dominating force in Reykjavík politics and holding a majority in the capital city from the 1930s until the mid-1990s (with a four year interval in [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] , had been struggling in the city ever since losing its majority The period 2010 to 2014 was characterised by highly unpopular reactions to the crisis, and in both Hafnarfjörður and Reykjanesbaer the ruling majorities could also be held accountable for the situations these municipalities were in, since they had ruled there during the boom years as well. Thus, probably predictably, they both lost their majorities in 2014. The Independence Party in Reykjanesbaer losing three of its seven council members and the Social Democrats two of its five in Hafnarfjörður. In both these towns the losing parties were not invited to join the majority (see figures 6 and 7). (Íslandsbanki, 2015) . Others are currently weathering the storm.
